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Preparing for Humanitarian Demining 
 in Post-conflict Colombia
Nearly a decade after launching an effort to build national capacity to clear landmines from its terri-
tory, the Colombian government still faces significant challenges in addressing the country’s mine 
problem, which has claimed more than 11,000 victims since 1991.1 Although the overall number of 
new landmine victims significantly decreased over the past eight years, survey and clearance work 
has been limited to more secure zones of the countryside because of the threat from nonstate 
armed groups to deminers and people living in conflict areas. Meanwhile, the risk to civilians living 
in parts of the country where demining activities have not taken place has not changed significantly, 
and Colombia remains among the countries with the highest number of mine casualties each year.
by Carl Case [ Organization of American States ]
In recent months, the advance of direct talks between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia – FARC) raised optimism about a 
near-term negotiated settlement to Colom-
bia’s decades-old conflict that would open 
most parts of the country to mineaction 
interventions. The key task that the govern-
ment needs to accomplish in order to elimi-
nate the threat of landmines in the shortest 
time possible is to define the scope of mine 
contamination clearly in order to facilitate 
effective prioritization of areas and efficient 
use of available resources.
Prior to 2015, the Colombian government’s 
planning of humanitarian demining activi-
ties was limited to midterm programming of 
operations in municipalities considered se-
cure. The three-year plans presented by the 
Colombian government, in conjunction with 
its 2010 request to extend its clearance dead-
line under Article 5 of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction (APMBC) and again at the 
Convention’s Third Review Conference, pro-
vided little detail on the scope of the problem, 
projecting mine clearance work in secure 
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parts of the country only. Insufficient information on the ex-
tent of mine contamination is problematic for the planning 
and mobilization of resources for humanitarian demining, 
and remains the single most significant issue the government 
faces in tackling Colombia’s mine problem. 
Beginning in early 2015, however, the dynamics of mine 
action in Colombia changed significantly. Since the initiation 
of direct talks between the government and FARC in 2012, the 
peace process has yielded substantive agreements on the road 
to achieving a negotiated end to the 50-year conflict. Although 
several issues remain to be resolved before a comprehensive 
settlement is complete, agreements on land restitution and ru-
ral development, political participation, and a way forward 
confronting the illicit drug trade have raised optimism that 
the remaining agenda items can be rectified. Ending the fight-
ing and beginning the disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration of insurgent combatants remains a key point.
Discussions in early 2015 focused on measures designed 
to decrease the intensity of the conflict as a prelude to a pos-
sible ceasefire and eventual agreement on demobilization. In 
March 2015, government and FARC negotiators agreed upon 
a confidence-building process to establish safe conditions for 
residents of high-risk areas contaminated by landmines and 
other explosive remnants of war. The parties agreed to im-
plement a pilot clearance project within the framework of 
conflict de-escalation, prioritizing sites where the population 
is at greatest risk.2
Preparedness for a Broader Effort
Elevation of the mine issue in the peace talks not only 
served to launch the pilot effort to begin survey and clearance 
of areas where mine risk is greatest, it also gave renewed ur-
gency to preparedness for quickly identifying and clearing a 
much broader part of the country. The reorganization of the 
presidential cabinet following the re-election of President 
Juan Manuel Santos included the designation of a Minister 
for Post-Conflict who is tasked with land restitution, victims’ 
rights and landmine issues under a coherent implementation 
strategy. Bringing these interrelated elements together poses a 
significant challenge for the Colombian government. In many 
cases, land restitution and resettlement of displaced popula-
tions were impeded by many factors, including the ongoing 
conflict and the limitations in the government’s efforts to de-
fine the extent of the landmine problem in the countryside, as 
well as by its still relatively modest capacity to clear hazardous 
areas once they are identified. 
With at least 400 government deminers from the 
Colombian military and another 160 from The HALO Trust 
deployed for clearance and survey work in four of the country’s 
32 administrative departments, Colombia faces a huge task in 
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Figure 1. Landmine accidents by department, 2010–2014.
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moving quickly to address mine contamination. Landmines 
affect as many as 11 departments severely, and have at least 
moderately impacted another three. Underlying the degree to 
which the task will grow as the peace process progresses is the 
fact that of these 14 departments that account for more than 
97 percent of all landmine accidents in Colombia in the past 
five years, only one, Antioquia, is currently the site of mine 
clearance or survey activities. Moreover, government data also 
shows that 75 percent of the accidents in the past five years oc-
curred in departments where no humanitarian demining op-
erations were ongoing.3
In February 2015, the government announced a new 
plan to expand its institutional clearance capacity by pro-
jecting the conversion of up to 10,000 military personnel to 
Colombian deminer training for clearance operations.
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humanitarian demining tasks by 2017. Also announced was 
an effort to speed up the accreditation process for civilian de-
mining organizations to no more than six months duration 
before the end of 2015. The key question about the viability 
of these projections lay in the lack of funding to train, equip 
and deploy large numbers of deminers without major external 
funding and technical support. The government’s own projec-
tions cited the need for US$151 million from international do-
nors for the first year following the signing of a peace accord 
in order to carry out these plans, representing a more than 30-
fold increase in the annual amount of external financing that 
has been available over the past five years. Funding require-
ments needed to execute the expansion and clearance efforts 
through 2021 were set at more than an additional $308 mil-
lion.4 While some increase in international support could be 
expected following the signing of a peace agreement with the 
remaining nonstate armed groups, funding will most likely 
not reach the levels needed to support Colombia’s projections.
Defining the Problem
Given the urgency of survey and clearance work in parts of 
the country where the mine problem is most severe but poor-
ly defined, an approach is needed that clarifies the extent and 
scope of contamination in order to prioritize efforts for the 
next two to three years while military and civilian demining 
capacities expand. To date, security has been the overarch-
ing consideration in assigning municipalities for demining 
operations. However, in a post-conflict context, areas with 
the greatest risk to the local population should be considered 
highest priority. Thus far, little evaluation has been conducted 
using risk as the principal criterion for survey and clearance 
prioritization.
The government has a huge volume of statistical infor-
mation related to landmines, but to this point, has had lit-
tle success in trying to catalogue and analyze some 30,000 
indicators or “events” involving landmines that occurred 
since 1991. Events include accidents, mine clearance during 
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Figure 2. Landmine accidents versus clearance status in selected municipalities.5
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military operations, improvised mine and explosive cache 
discoveries, and reports on suspected mined areas. Many of 
these data points lack specific geographic location data. Ef-
forts to eliminate the least useful data have thus far been met 
with only limited success, and the database is not particularly 
useful in either defining the extent and scope of mine contam-
ination or in setting priorities for humanitarian demining ac-
tivities. One of the means used in the past to clear events from 
the system has been the use of non-technical survey (NTS) 
by teams operating in municipalities approved for demin-
ing operations. However, experiences in municipalities where 
NTS was used to confirm or cancel suspected hazardous areas 
(SHA) indicate that only a small percentage of events in the 
national database resulted in confirmation of mine contami-
nation. For example, in San Carlos, Antioquia, an extensive 
survey effort in 2011 resulted in the cancellation of about 90 
percent of the events investigated as SHAs. 
Accident statistics found within the database could, by 
themselves, provide a more useful tool for prioritizing areas 
for countrywide demining operations. A review of accident 
data points shows the mine problem to be more concen-
trated in fewer areas of the country than the national totals 
would seem to indicate. As the overall number of landmine 
accidents decreased significantly over an eight-year peri-
od, a limited number of municipalities exist where the rate 
of mine casualties remains high. Twenty-one municipalities, 
registering an average of at least four mine accidents per year 
between 2010 and 2014, accounted for 54 percent of all ac-
cidents nationwide, and a total of 50 municipalities report-
ed more than 75 percent of all accidents in the same period. 
All of these cases were concentrated in the 13 most severely 
impacted departments: Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó, 
Cordoba, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, 
Putumayo, Tolima and Valle del Cauca.
In most clearance operations conducted by the Colombian 
military’s humanitarian demining units, the density of mined 
areas was found to be extremely sparse. Analysis of the San 
Carlos case shows that 63 improvised mines and six pieces of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found when clearing near-
ly 160,000 sq m (1,722,224 sq ft) over a period of almost three 
years. Similar results are characteristic of all mine clearance 
operations in Colombia to date, despite marked improvement 
in amount of SHAs canceled through NTS. In all clearance 
operations in civilian communities since 2007, the density 
of mines and UXO has been one unit for every 1,710 sq m 
(18,406 sq ft) of land cleared.3
Before the start of extensive demining activities in San 
Carlos, the incidence of mine accidents began to drop precipi-
tously. According to Dirección para la Acción Integral contra 
Minas Antipersonal, which is responsible for the coordination 
of the Colombian government’s mine action program and is 
the Technical Secretariat for the National Mine Action Au-
thority, the number of accidents fell from a high point of 52 
in 2005 to 15, 14, four and two in subsequent years before ex-
tensive survey and clearance operations began there.5 In every 
other municipality where sustained demining interventions 
have taken place since 2009, mine accident figures followed 
a similar trend.
Improvised Mine Life Span
Another critical factor in determining where to focus 
efforts in a post-conf lict context is the impact of mine 
functionality over time. A rigorous, scientific study of the 
impact of aging on various types of improvised mines used 
in Colombia has not yet been conducted, limiting conclu-
sions to those drawn from anecdotal observations. How-
ever, the downward trend in the number of mine accidents 
in municipalities considered secure, or consolidated, shows 
a more significant correlation between the point when a 
municipality is sufficiently secure to begin humanitarian 
demining activities than to when survey and mine clearance 
operations are actually initiated.
The historical case of El Salvador holds some useful in-
sights about the impact of mine aging and functionality that 
could be applicable in Colombia. Following the peace agree-
ment that ended El Salvador’s internal conflict in 1992, a 
Typical construction of an improvised landmine in Colombia.
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limited effort was made to mark and 
clear mined areas that were installed by 
government forces. Use of improvised 
landmines by the Salvadoran insurgen-
cy was widespread, causing roughly half 
of the Salvadoran military’s casualties 
in the final seven years of the conflict. 
The mines were similar in construction 
and function to those currently being 
used by nonstate armed groups in Co-
lombia. When the fighting ended in El 
Salvador, the number of mine accidents 
quickly declined. In 1992, there were 
579 victims of accidents with mines and 
UXO. The following year, the number 
fell to 259, and only one of these was at-
tributed to an improvised landmine.6
Improvised mines used by nonstate 
armed groups in Colombia vary in size 
and construction, but they most often 
use 9-volt alkaline batteries to initiate 
detonation. Although mines are usu-
ally emplaced using plastic bags and 
other material to limit vulnerability to 
moisture, battery life is critical to deter-
mining whether a mine will continue 
functioning. Commercially sold, alka-
line batteries advertise a shelf life of no 
more than five years under ideal stor-
age conditions and can probably func-
tion for a shorter period of time when 
employed in improvised mines that are 
fully or partially buried, particular-
ly given the damp, tropical conditions 
found in most parts of the country.
Prioritization of Work
Considering the probable limited 
life cycle of improvised mines, the con-
centration of the most serious mine 
problems in 50 of Colombia’s 1,119 mu-
nicipalities, and the limited existing 
survey and clearance capacity, the gov-
ernment should avoid undertaking a 
dispersed, unfocused nationwide clear-
ance effort and instead prioritize its 
strategy and planning based on sever-
ity of impact. Accident data since 2010 
provides the best evidence for bring-
ing areas of greatest risk into focus to 
help define clearance priorities. This 
information can best determine when 
and where to deploy clearance assets. 
NTS teams will be key in reducing the 
amount of surface area requiring clear-
ance in priority zones.
Other municipalities that fall outside 
this high-priority category also need to 
be addressed. Of particular importance 
is land release to displaced and dispos-
sessed populations across a broader 
part of the country. In these munici-
palities, NTS teams can play an impor-
tant role in canceling areas that remain 
in Colombia’s database because of mine 
events that occurred in previous de-
cades. SHAs that cannot be canceled 
will still require clearance assets before 
being released through technical sur-
vey demining. However, survey teams 
marking these areas, accompanied by 
prevention campaigns, will greatly re-
duce the risk to nearby communities 
until clearance is carried out.
Conclusion
Colombia will face many chal-
lenges in the coming years as it deals 
with its longstanding mine problem. 
A peace agreement between the gov-
ernment and nonstate armed groups 
would likely open most of Colombia 
for humanitarian demining activities, 
but the country’s size and geography 
demand a strategy that will prioritize 
areas of greatest need first for survey 
and clearance while national capacity 
is expanded. Understanding the extent, 
severity and nature of mine contamina-
tion is critical to developing future in-
tervention plans, and the information 
to develop this awareness is available 
now to begin preparations for work to-
ward a mine-free Colombia. 
See endnotes page 65
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